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By Thomas Fleming (SUC News Bulletin Issue 150, June 1, 1998) Illyria Americana Walt Whitman was a bad poet, but he might have made an excellent American statesman, something like an effeminate Madelaine Albright who can switch from one basic principle to the next with the duplicity that even dewy-eyed fairy godmother of the battlefield would have admired. In the course of a day, she can be lecturing the Republika Srpska of Bosnia on the rights of Muslim and Croat minorities; then, without batting a reptilian eye, she can champion the right of the Albanian majority in Kosovo to gain autonomy, which will inevitably entail the right to expel (or extenminate) the Serb minority that has clung to its ancient land in the face of over half a millennium of persecution and ethnic cleansing.
Perhaps in their hearts, many statesmen are really bad poets: they prefer lies to
truth and rely on poetic license as an excuse for incompetence and incoherence. I have
been trying to figure our American policy in the Balkans for six years, and the best I
can come up with is that we are hostage to special interests - the Croatian and Albanian
lobbies obviously, Arab oil interests, and (strange as it seems) the Israelis, who have
found a way of doing something to please the Muslims. The United States
and Israel, in other words, are making the Serbs pay the price for what we are doing to
Muslims in the Middle East.
But even bribery and cowardice don't fully explain the zeal of the American foreign
policy establishment and the media it controls. Their minds are already formed in
globalist categories to see nationalism, Christian piety, and attachment to tradition
as the last vestiges of a savage old world that must be rooted out no matter what the
cost, and although the Albanians and Croats are, each in their own way, as atavistic as
their Serbian neighbors, it is the Serbs who have historically been predominant in the
region, and it is the Serbs who sing the loudest songs about their heritage and their
destiny. The globalist elites hate the Serbs for the same reason that they hate all real
Americans who wish to preserve their traditions, their religion, their identity. This
point was rammed home to me on the SFOR base in Sarajevo, where American soldier-girls
lugged their lard-bellies, huffing and puffing, up the steps of the cafeteria - an oasis
of bad cooking - where the bulletin boards featured (on paper of U.N. blue) advertisements
for Black History Month.
The Balkans were heating up again early this year: riots in Kosovo followed by a
Yugoslav crackdown followed by an American crackdown, renewed talk of Montenegrin
independence, Bosnian Muslim threats over the postponed Brcko decision. By March, Boris
Yeltsin's intoxicated hints about World War III breaking out over Iraq seemed more likely
to be realized in Europe.
In tripartite Bosnia, the Muslims are no longer content with the cards they were dealt
in the Dayton Accords: so far, they have been disappointed in the expectation that a
liberal interpretation of the agreement would improve their hand. The Republika Srpska
remains divided between the old warlords of Pale, who exploited their political ineptitude
- they never devised a tax system, much less a strategy for victory - as an excuse for
massive corruption, and the democratically elected government of President Biljana Plavsic,
a staunch Serb patriot whose sense of justice and integrity has been misinterpreted as
proof that she is a Quisling who would betray her country to the United States.
Kosovo is, for the moment, and even more serious question. We saw last year
what Albanians can do to each other if they are allowed to go on a rampage (to
say nothing of the crime waves Albanian immigrants have inflicted on Europe and
the United States), and this violence is nothing compared to what they will do,
with a little air support from their American friends, when the Shiptar begin
to riot in Macedonia and Greece.
Meanwhile, the Hungarians of Serbian Vojvodina are clamoring for their
autonomy, and their cousins in Slovakia are pressuring the Slovak government to
demand autonomy for Kosova (notice how many American journalists, by the way,
are adopting the Albanian pronunciation of a purely Slavic word - from kos,
blackbird - that means nothing in Albanian). The Slovaks, who have had the
chance to bear the gentle yoke of imperial Hungary, are quick to understand that
the call for greater Albania being heard in Kosovo (and echoed by Albanian
spokesmen in the United States like former congressman Joseph Dio-Guardi) will
soon reverberate in hamrony with demands for a Greater Hungary that will include
parts of Serbia, Romania, and Slovakia.
Caught in a three-way bind - Albanians, Hungarians, and the American-backed
jihad in Bosnia - the Serbs see the handwriting on the wall, and the letters are
not Cyrillic. The mood in Belgrade is deep depression. No gypsy bands play in the
streets, no one sings patriotic songs in the cafes. The gray buildings seem
silent - "bare ruin'd choirs, where no birds sing." Since the United States
quashed the demonstrations last year by reaffirming its support for Milosevic,
people do not know where to turn.
Srdja Trifkovic arranged a dinner in Belgrade with Serb intellectuals, and
over a first course of bull's testicles and Vranac (a Montenegrin red wine),
Dragomir Acimovic (architect Rotarian, and royalist) observed with a cheerful
gloominess that the Serbs "are dying as a nation and dying as a people." Acovic,
a man of affable wit and vast erudition, must also know that quite apart from his
notion he belongs to a dying breed of civilized men who will never fit into the
New World Order. He has good reasons for despair: the "ex" communists still hold
his family's property, and he knows that more than one of the so-called opposition
leaders is willing to sell out Milosevic.
When I pointed out the parallel with the mood in 1865 of defeated Southerners,
who thought that God was punishing them for their lack of faith, Dusan Batakovic
(research director of the Institute for Balkan Studies) quips, "I always sided with
the losers in America - Indians and Southerners." Such sympathy is natural for
Serbs who have been subjugated by Turks, Hungarians, Austrians, Germans, and
Americans, and whose great national myth is their failure to defeat the Turks at
the battle of Kosovo in 1389.
The general pessimism is shared by Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the
Democratic Party, virtually the only major political party that has preserved its
reputation for integrity. Kostunica takes a gloomy view of Serbia's political
future, and his prediction that one or another of Milosevic's opponents will lead
his party into the government is fulfilled within two weeks.
Serbian politics is complicated by the rioting in Kosovo. Imagine the situation
in the United States if Mexico immigrants became a majority in Texas and, aided
and abetted by Mexico, plotted a violent insurrection. When police arrest one of
the terrorist leaders, the insurgents riot in San Antonio, and when the governor
calls in the National Guard, the international community threatens sanctions.
The Mexicans or rather, to drop the analogy, the Albanians are pursuing a
two-tier strategy. They insist they are open to dialogue, but the only question
they are willing to discuss is the timetable for independence. The crackdown,
although completely justified from the standpoint of law and order, was a bad
move, as Kostunica points out since it had the effect of reversing the progress
Serbia had been making in the international community.
Milosevic, who lost the Krajina and bargained away Sarajevo, is now in a
position to lose the ancient heartland of the Serbs, and Kostunica ruefully
concludes: "One always hopes that Milosevic will learn from his mistakes, but
one is always disappointed." Asked if the leader may be conspiring with the
Americans - as it sometimes appears - Kostunica points out that Milosevic simply
cannot afford to pay the price. The loss of Kosovo will be a greater blow to his
government than even the debacle in the Krajina, where U.S. military intervention
paved the way for a Croatian offensive that expelled whatever Serb civilians
managed to escape. Milosevic's rise to power began when he took up the cause of
the downtrodden Kosovo Serbs, and because the Albanians refuse to vote, he can
count on 35 "cheap" deputies elected by Serbs who are naturally loyal to their
champion. The career that began in Kosovo may end there as well. Still, despite
Albright's threats, Slobodan Milosevic's shelf-life has not yet expired.
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